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Abstract: The de Larosière reform package of 2009 officially established the three European 
financial sector supervisory authorities (ESAs), namely, the European Banking Authority (EBA), 
the European Securities and Market Authority (ESMA) and the European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA). Fully operational since January 2011, the three ESAs 
have been developing and enforcing the single supervision rule books in their respective 
sectors and issuing binding decisions to ensure greater regulatory consistency. Furthermore, 
since the 2008 global financial crisis and the subsequent Eurozone crisis, there have been 
several waves of new EU legislation in banking, securities and insurance, which have further 
expanded the powers, responsibilities and tasks of the three ESAs. Important revised and new 
legislation includes: the revised Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV) and the recent 
Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) in banking; the revised Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive II (MiFID II), the recent Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation 
(MiFIR) and European Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) in securities; and the revised 
Solvency II Directive in insurance. This chapter examines the institutional evolution of the 
three ESAs and how their roles have changed as a consequence of the global financial crisis 
and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis.  




The 2008 global financial crisis led to a severe economic downturn in advanced industrialised 
economies. Considering that weak financial sector oversight contributed to the crisis, there 
was an unparalleled opportunity for redesigning financial sector supervision in the European 
Union (EU) (FSA 2009; Moloney 2011a; Haentjens and Wessels 2015). A vantage point a 
decade after the financial crisis provides a good opportunity to assess the institutional 
developments in EU financial regulation and supervision. This chapter examines the impact of 
the 2008 global financial crisis and the subsequent Eurozone sovereign debt crisis on the 
institutional development of the three financial sector European Supervisory Authorities 
(ESAs), particularly focusing on the case of the European Securities and Markets Authority 
(ESMA). I investigate the tasks that the three ESAs have performed since their creation and 
how these have changed and expanded as a consequence of the global financial crisis and the 
Eurozone sovereign debt crisis.  
In the overarching architecture of European financial sector governance, the three ESAs 
are the successors to three smaller networked committees of national supervisory authorities 
with limited decision-making powers – the so-called level 3 committees (Quaglia 2010).  Set 
up as part of the Lamfalussy financial supervision reforms, the level 3 committees played an 
important role in exchanging best practices across member states and sectors, and in 
facilitating regulatory convergence (European Central Bank 2007; Grossman and Leblond 
2011).  However, they were only authorised to issue non-binding recommendations.  In 
recognition of the need for further institutional reforms in EU financial supervision, the three 
level 3 committees signed a joint protocol on cooperation to ensure greater coherence and 
consistency as early as November 2005, well before the outbreak of the 2008 crisis.  They 
pledged to share information more effectively, exchange experience, reduce duplication of 
reporting and issue joint reports and strategies for future development (European Central 
Bank 2007). 
In the aftermath of the most severe global economic crisis since the Great Depression, 
and as part of the so-called 2009 de Larosière reforms, the three Lamfalussy committees 
became European supervisory authorities (ESAs), namely, the European Banking Authority 
(EBA), the European Securities and Market Authority (ESMA) and the European Insurance and 
Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA). Fully operational since January 2011, the three ESAs 
have been developing and enforcing the single supervision rule books in their respective 
sector and issuing binding decisions to ensure greater regulatory coherence. As we will see in 
the case of ESMA, now the ESAs can take decisions with a direct and binding effect on market 
participants and national supervisory organisations. Previously, this was not possible under 
the Lamfalussy framework. 
The central argument in this chapter is that the crises affecting the EU’s financial and 
economic order since 2008 created a momentum for centralisation of governance, as shown 
by the creation of new EU bodies and transfer of powers and competences from the member 
states to the EU level (see also Salines et al. 2012; Howarth and Quaglia 2016; Quaglia and 
Spendzharova 2017). Furthermore, since becoming operational in 2011, the three ESAs have 
received new responsibilities and powers to ensure harmonised rule application across the EU 
as a consequence of a series of incremental EU legislative reforms, where unintended 
consequences have been an important factor reinforcing the trend toward greater 
supranationalisation that started in 2008.  
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The chapter is organised as follows: section two outlines the evolution of the European 
financial sector governance framework and the role of the ESAs. Section three discusses the 
increasing powers of ESMA as a case study of the changing roles and tasks of the EU financial 
supervisory bodies. Subsequently, section four puts forward the analytical framework, 
focusing on the far-reaching effects of incremental institutional change in financial regulation 
and section five applies this framework to the case of ESMA. Finally, section six considers legal 
challenges taken up by the member states, in particular, the case brought by the UK against 
the Council and the European Parliament regarding the EU Regulation on Short Selling (case 
C-270/12) and section seven summarises the main findings. 
2. The institutional evolution of EU financial sector regulation 
This section starts with a brief overview of recent milestones in EU financial regulation, which 
helps to contextualise the increased powers of the European supervisory authorities.  The first 
overarching policy at the EU level in the realm of financial markets and services was the 
Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) covering the period 1999-2005.  Due to its slow 
implementation, in 2000, the ECOFIN Council of Ministers appointed an expert committee, 
chaired by Alexandre Lamfalussy, to speed up EU-wide convergence in regulating securities 
markets.  The so-called Lamfalussy financial supervision framework was adopted in 2002 after 
lengthy negotiations between the European Commission, Council, and Parliament. 
Subsequently, the principles outlined in the Lamfalussy report for the securities sector were 
extended to banking and insurance (Lannoo 2002; Quaglia 2007, 2010).  In 2004, the European 
Commission reviewed the Lamfalussy process and engaged in extensive consultations to fine-
tune its implementation.  The Commission’s White Paper on Financial Services 2005-2010 
succeeded the FSAP in terms of providing an overarching vision for developing the single 
market in financial services (European Commission 2005; see also Masciandaro et al. 2009; 
Quaglia 2010; Grossman and Leblond 2011). 
The three level 3 committees, namely, the Committee of European Banking Supervisors 
(CEBS), the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) and the Committee of 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions (CEIOPS), were among the most innovative 
institutional features of the Lamfalussy financial supervision framework.  They were set up to 
foster the exchange of best practices across member states and sectors, and to facilitate 
regulatory convergence (European Central Bank 2007; Grossman and Leblond 2011).  
However, they were only authorised to issue non-binding recommendations.  In November 
2005, the three committees signed a joint protocol on cooperation to ensure greater 
coherence and consistency.  They pledged to share information more effectively, exchange 
experience, reduce duplication of reporting and issue joint reports and strategies for future 
development (European Central Bank 2007). 
In the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, the European Commission launched 
a new initiative to redesign the European financial architecture following the 
recommendations of another high-level expert group, chaired by Jacques de Larosière (see 
Hodson and Quaglia 2009; Quaglia 2010; Mügge 2010; Posner and Véron 2010).  These 
reforms envisaged the creation of a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) in charge of macro-
prudential supervision – monitoring and assessing systemic risk in European financial markets 
(European Commission 2009b).  A second institution – the European System of Financial 
Supervisors (ESFS) – would complement the ESRB in the realm of micro-prudential 
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supervision.  The ESFS includes the three new European supervisory authorities in banking, 
securities and insurance (European Commission 2009c; Amtenbrink 2011).   
The first new institution, the European Systemic Risk Board, monitors risks to financial 
stability in the EU-28 and has been received by the member states fairly free of controversy.  
It is comprised of the 28 national central bank governors of the EU member states, the two 
top European Central Bank officials, as well as representatives of the Commission and the 
three newly-created European supervisory authorities.  The second institution, the European 
System of Financial Supervisors, has caused more debate.  The de Larosière reforms 
empowered the ESAs to issue decisions with binding power.  While member states in favour 
of greater centralisation and harmonisation of financial regulation as well as the European 
Commission and Parliament welcomed the enhancement of the ESAs’ powers, other member 
states voiced concerns about possible loss of national regulatory autonomy and potential 
fiscal burdens (Buckley and Howarth 2010; Mügge 2011; Spendzharova 2012, 2014; 
Spendzharova and Bayram 2016).  These tensions become clear when we consider the case of 
ESMA discussed below. 
3. The increasing powers of ESMA 
ESMA is an integral part of the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), together with 
the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority (EIOPA) and the relevant national competent authorities of the EU member states. 
The central mission of ESMA is to ‘enhance investor protection and promote stable and 
orderly financial markets’ (ESMA 2016). This translates into three objectives: investor 
protection, orderly markets and financial stability (ESMA 2016). While investor protection has 
always been within the core mandate of national securities markets regulators, safeguarding 
financial stability is a novel addition to the objectives of securities regulators, which has come 
to their attention in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis. Thus, as pointed out by 
ESMA’s Chair, Steven Maijoor, in addition to its core investor protection mandate, ESMA has 
been very active in the field of financial stability (Maijoor 2016). 
To achieve its mission and objectives, ESMA’s activities fall in four core areas: assessing 
risks to investors, markets and financial stability; completing the single rulebook for EU 
financial markets; promoting supervisory convergence; and directly supervising some financial 
entities which are essential for the EU’s financial markets infrastructure, such as credit rating 
agencies (CRAs) and trade repositories (TRs). As ESMA (2016) points out, these four types of 
activities are closely interlinked. Risk assessments are used as input for work on the single 
rulebook and supervisory convergence. Better supervisory convergence itself is seen as a 
desirable outcome of the single rulebook. Lastly, the direct supervision of CRAs and TRs 
provides information for ESMA’s risk assessments and its single rulebook actions, and vice 
versa. 
More than a decade after its predecessor, CESR, was set up, ESMA has gained and 
exercised a wide range of powers that substantially exceed CESR’s competencies and even 
approximate those of its US counterpart – the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). To 
name the main powers of the agency, ESMA develops guidelines, recommendations and draft 
regulatory and implementing technical standards in the area of securities regulation. It can 
also issue opinions to the EU institutions, which is relevant for ongoing EU legislative 
negotiations in financial sector governance (Moloney 2011a; 2011b). Within its 
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responsibilities to promote convergence of supervisory practices across the EU, ESMA has 
powers to conduct peer reviews, identify best practices, mediate and resolve disputes 
between national competent authorities of the member states and cooperate with the ESRB 
in the field of systemic risk, especially risks stemming from financial innovation (see also 
Moloney 2011a; 2011b; Schammo 2011). Next, let us examine the relevance of 
incrementalism for understanding the recent EU reforms of financial sector governance. 
4. Analytical framework: The far-reaching effects of incremental institutional change 
Rational institutional design models of agency creation emphasise the ability of public actors 
to create or reshape institutions in order to best pursue shared public policy goals, such as 
financial stability. For example, Howlett & Rayner (2007, p. 7) have examined a variety of 
‘integrated strategies’ in rational policy design, through which governments attempt to 
achieve ‘coherent policy goals, relying on a consistent set of policy instruments that support 
each other in the achievement of the policy goals’. According to this model of agency creation, 
setting up new bodies and the delegation of powers is the result of deliberate and targeted 
choices by public actors (Howlett 2011). 
By contrast, incrementalism is an alternative framework that can account for the 
institutional development of ESMA since its creation, drawing on the work of Charles 
Lindblom. He used the metaphor of the branch method to describe his approach, ‘continually 
building out from the current situation, step-by-step and by small degrees’, rather than 
starting from scratch every time decision-makers encounter a problem (Lindblom 1959, p. 81).  
Lindblom’s analytical framework is particularly relevant for policy environments where 
decision-makers are faced with conflicting priorities and disagree about the most appropriate 
course of action.  Such constraints become all the more evident and important in fragmented 
multi-layer systems of decision-making such as the European Union.  The simple rank ordering 
of policy alternatives is not feasible, and policy actors often neglect important possible 
outcomes and alternative policies.  In the end, policy adjustment tends to occur in the margins 
because decision-makers ‘simultaneously choose a policy to attain certain objectives and 
choose the objectives themselves’ (Lindblom 1959, p. 82).   
Incrementalism entails policy adjustments in the margins.  At the same time, Lindblom 
has stressed in his later work that ‘incrementalism in politics is not, in principle, slow 
moving...not necessarily, therefore, a tactic of conservatism’ (Lindblom 1979, p. 520).  He even 
suggested that a fast-moving sequence of small changes could bring about a substantial 
change in the status quo. This may very well be what we are currently observing with the 
growing powers and prominence of ESMA in European financial sector governance.  
In complex decision-making involving many actors, the ‘best’ policy emerges not out of 
a comparison against an abstract ideal, but out of a pragmatic agreement on a policy that is 
acceptable to all parties (Lindblom 1959, p. 82). This aspect of Lindblom’s work is especially 
relevant for understanding collective action in the EU. While Lindblom’s incremental model of 
policy change is derived from a pluralist system of interest representation, such as the USA, it 
applies well to the current multi-level system of EU decision-making, where supranational, 
national, and subnational interests, as well as organised business, other stakeholders and 
labour shape policy together. 
In addition to those aspects of incrementalism, Lindblom emphasised a cognitive 
component.  Decision-makers focus on a few policy alternatives only marginally different from 
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the status quo, because this approach makes the most of existing knowledge and their ability 
to anticipate the future consequences of their most preferred policy.  Otherwise, when there 
are too many moving pieces, one cannot credibly predict the actual impact of policy change.  
The literature on bounded rationality has developed this insight further.  Decision-makers 
often have to generate the possible policy alternatives themselves and define them according 
to their understanding of the problem at hand (Simon 1979; 1996).  More recently, public 
policy scholars have shown that actors tend to have ready policy solutions which they put 
forward when a window of opportunity opens, often created by a crisis or policy failure (Cohen 
et al. 1972; Kingdon 1996).  In response to the powerful critique by scholars of incrementalism 
and bounded rationality, recent work in rational choice institutionalism has developed a more 
nuanced understanding of rationality, taking into consideration the cognitive constraints of 
decision-makers. 
Drawing on the cognitive aspect of partisan mutual adjustment, Lindblom’s work on 
incrementalism can be used to shed light on how decision-makers overcome collective action 
problems in the EU.  Committed to the overarching project of completing the single market in 
financial services, most EU member states would find a common set of financial regulation 
rules to be more optimal than the perpetuation of a myriad of national regulations. Yet what 
kind of harmonised policy could satisfy the member states and the EU institutions involved in 
negotiating new legislation?  
5. Incremental institutional upgrading of the European supervisory authorities: the 
case of ESMA 
Drawing on the case of ESMA, I argue below that expanding the decision-making powers of 
level 3 Lamfalussy committees emerged as a key focal point of the early discussions on 
reforming EU financial sector governance. However, these institutional reforms became 
politically feasible only after the 2008 global financial crisis and gained further momentum 
during the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. 
In 2010, the EU institutions adopted the ground-breaking Directive 2010/78/EU, also 
known as the Omnibus I directive, which spelled out the new supervisory framework and main 
powers of the ESAs, including ESMA. The following year, they passed another directive, 
Omnibus II, that empowered the ESAs even further. Figure 3 presents an overview of the 
incremental increase of ESMA’s powers since 2011 through new and revised EU legislation in 
the realm of developing draft technical and implementing standards in securities regulation, 
market transparency and investor protection as well as post-trading. 
The adoption of recent financial markets legislation, such as the European Market 
Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR, 2012), the revised Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
(MiFID II, 2014) and Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFIR, 2014) shows an 
incremental trend over time toward reinforcing and expanding ESMA’s powers as a European 
financial sector regulator. As shown in Figure 3, EMIR (2012) expanded ESMA’s powers in the 
realm of post-trading. Subsequently, the Regulation on Short Selling and Certain Aspects of 
Credit Default Swaps (2012) reinforced ESMA’s powers in ensuring market integrity and 
transparency. The agency’s market integrity and investor protection powers were further 
expanded in 2014 by the Market Abuse Regulation (MAR). Lastly, four substantial pieces of 
legislation expanded ESMA’s powers in the realm of drafting regulatory technical standards 
(RTS) and implementing technical standards (ITS). These are the Markets in Financial 
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Instruments Regulation (MiFIR, 2014), Market Abuse Regulation (MAR, 2014), EU Benchmarks 
Regulation (2015) and (Securities) Prospectus Regulation (2017). 
Moreover, ESMA has a wide range of implementing tasks for existing (and amended) 
legislation in the realm of securities regulation, such as the Prospectus Directive (2003, 
amended 2010) and the newly adopted Prospectus Regulation (2017), the Transparency 
Directive (2003, amended 2013), the UCITS Directive (2009, amended 2010, 2011, 2013, 2014) 
and the AIFMD Directive (2011). 
With respect to financial and staff resources available to the ESAs, including ESMA, to 
carry out their rapidly expanding set of tasks and responsibilities, as shown in Figures 1 and 2 
below, the ESAs’ total budgets have more than doubled during the first years of their 
operations, with an average growth rate of more than 25% per year (European Commission 
2017: 164). On the one hand, the budgetary growth was factored in the amounts earmarked 
for the ESAs in the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020 to ensure the 
implementation of the single rule books in their respective sector. The estimates also show 
that no substantial budgetary growth can be accommodated from 2018 onwards. 
On the other hand, in line with an incrementalist account, it seems that the new tasks 
and demands placed on the ESAs, including ESMA, surpass their current resources. For 
example, due to budget constraints, ESMA had to remove from its IT Work Programme 2017-
2019 the development of the European Electronic Access Point (EEAP) in favour of the 
implementation of the Prospectus Directive and Money Market Funds Regulation projects, 
even though both actions are required from ESMA under the current EU legislation (European 
Commission 2017, p. 165). Furthermore, staff testimonies before the EU Parliament show that 
the ESAs have difficulties in meeting their objectives in a number of crucial areas such as 
assessments of third country equivalence, consumer protection and supervisory convergence 
(European Commission 2017, p. 165). 
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Figure 1: ESAs budget contribution from the EU budget, MFF 2014-2020 
 
Source: European Commission (2017) 
Figure 2: ESAs total number of staff employed 
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EBA 14,7 22,4 0 37,1 
ESMA 10,2 16,2 10,5 36,9 
EIOPA 8,3 13,3 0 21,6 
 
Source: European Commission (2017) 
As ESMA is a de facto European agency, it is important to relate the argument developed 
in this chapter about the incremental increase in powers of EU agencies to general 
explanations of agency formation (Busuioc et al. 2012; Busuioc 2013; Rittberger and Wonka 
2015; Egeberg and Trondal 2016; Bach et al. 2016). Groenleer (2011) puts forward three 
widely used accounts of agency creation in the literature – functional, political and 
transnational policy diffusion.  According to functional explanations, regulatory divergence 
across the Union and growing pressures on the Commission’s resources lead to setting up 
independent agencies.  Agencies bring together independent expertise at the EU level, 
increase the transparency and visibility of EU policymaking, and reduce transaction costs for 
national governments (Groenleer 2011; see also Dehousse 1997; Majone 1996).  According to 
political explanations, agencies demonstrate decision-makers’ credible commitment to 
optimise collective action arrangements and improve the regulatory environment, especially 
in the wake of a crisis (Kelemen 2002; Shapiro 1997; Kelemen and Tarrant 2011).  Lastly, policy 
diffusion explanations emphasise that, in the past two decades, governments have set up a 
large number of independent regulators at the domestic level.  This institutional design has 
been emulated at the European level.  In this context, European agencies are complementary 
to the national regulatory authorities and act as a hub for regulatory cooperation (Dehousse 
1997; Chiti 2000; Egeberg and Trondal 2009; Levi-Faur 2011).  In a similar vein, Yesilkagit and 
Christensen (2010) have tested two main explanations of the institutional design and formal 
autonomy of national regulatory agencies in Sweden, the Netherlands, and Denmark – 
historical-cultural and political ones. All in all, Groenleer (2011) notes that, overall, ‘most 
[European] agencies have a limited mandate...and only a few agencies have been granted 
decision-making tasks’. 
Against this backdrop, this chapter sheds light on the factors that made possible the 
creation and further delegation of powers to ESMA as a powerful European regulator. In order 
to trace the process of institutional reform, I draw on official reports evaluating the Lamfalussy 
and de Larosière frameworks, triangulated with official documents, the academic literature 
and systematic press coverage.  In particular, several expert committee assessments of the 
Lamfalussy financial regulation framework, as well as ECOFIN Council conclusions, show the 
build-up of functional pressures, especially in the mid-2000s, to enhance the powers of level 
3 committees and pursue greater regulatory coherence across the Union. Next, I discuss the 
conclusions and recommendations of those reports in greater detail. 
The first comprehensive review of the Lamfalussy framework in 2004 resulted in a 
positive assessment by ECOFIN and the extension of the general approach from securities to 
all financial services sectors.  We can glean experts’ reasoning from the regular reports of the 
Inter-institutional Monitoring Group (IIMG) which was responsible for assessing the 
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implementation of the Lamfalussy process and identifying bottlenecks.  Convened in 2003, the 
IIMG was reconstituted in 2005, following the extension of the Lamfalussy process to all 
financial services.  The IIMG highlighted that European financial markets had changed 
considerably and new issues needed to be addressed (IIMG 2007, p. 6).  For example, 
regulators increasingly had to oversee the activities of large cross-border European financial 
groups.  These market developments called for stronger coordination between the national 
supervisory authorities and more consistent application of EU rules across the member states 
to realise the full benefits of the single market (IIMG 2007, p. 13). 
The expert committee reports provide evidence of a gradual increase in the powers of 
the three Lamfalussy supervisory committees.  The initial focus of the committees’ work was 
on providing expert advice in the preparation of urgent sectoral legislation such as the Capital 
Requirements Directive (CRD), the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) and the 
Solvency Directive.  Later on, as member states started the implementation process, the 
convergence tasks of level 3 committees came to the foreground, and so did the question of 
their powers (FSC 2007, p. 6).  Level 3 committees faced mounting challenges due to the 
increased speed of market integration and growing prominence of financial conglomerates.  
In this new environment, the committees acquired new tasks, and their supervisory discretion 
grew over time.  After all, level 3 committees were the only European bodies that had both 
the staff and prior experience to handle the new regulatory pressures (FSC 2007: 8).  The sunk 
costs of establishing and funding the committees as well as increasing returns of promoting 
supervisory convergence served as a constraint on any alternative options for an institutional 
redesign.  In sum, we do observe some enhancement in the supervisory discretion of level 3 
Lamfalussy committees due to functional pressures, referring to Groenleer’s (2011) analysis.  
Yet this occurred without changing the committees’ legal basis and within the framework of 
issuing non-binding decisions, which suggests some political backlash against these functional 
pressures and the presence of actors wishing to constrain the independent decision-making 
powers of agencies (see Kelemen and Tarrant 2011; Busuioc 2013). 
The first reviews of the Lamfalussy process also show that a positive feedback effect 
supported the institutional development of level 3 committees.  They were largely seen to 
perform their tasks well and live up to the expectations of both the member states and EU 
institutions.  The IIMG applauded their important advisory work and stressed that they had 
fully met their original mandate (IIMG 2007, p. 15).  Based on its positive assessment of the 
committees’ performance, the IIMG recommended ‘a considerable uplift in their 
resources...which may require changes to the level 3 committees’ legal base or status within 
the EU system’ (IIMG 2007, pp. 18-19).  However, the IIMG also stressed that its members 
were divided about the need for such further empowerment.  Thus, despite the presence of a 
positive feedback effect supporting the further transfer of powers to level 3 Lamfalussy 
committees, important EU policy actors were not convinced that this step was necessary. 
The redesign of European financial regulation unfolded in a political environment where 
discretion in enforcement was relatively low, and the policy process was dominated by strong 
veto players – each of the EU’s legislative institutions could thwart the reform process. In this 
institutional environment, the literature on incrementalism would anticipate small gradual 
changes over time rather than bold institutional redesign in one go. Consistent with this 
expectation, the outcome of the de Larosière institutional redesign shows evidence of 
incremental institutional reform.  The European supervisory authorities, such as ESMA, are an 
upgrade of level 3 committees, but we also observe a very close correspondence in terms of 
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their core mandate, staff, and location. Furthermore, in the case of ESMA, three (out of six) 
important pieces of EU legislation shown in Figure 3 which conferred more powers to the 
agency after it became operational in 2011 are amended versions of existing EU directives or 
regulations, such as MiFID II and MiFIR and the Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) which 
replaced the 2004 Market Abuse Directive (MAD).   
By 2017, all ESAs, and ESMA in particular, have gained more binding powers and tasks 
compared to their predecessors in spite of opposition from some member states.  We find the 
greatest preference heterogeneity about the new European financial supervision architecture 
in the Council.  The European Commission and Parliament clearly favoured a further transfer 
of powers to the European supervisory authorities in order to enhance regulatory 
convergence in the Union and ensure stronger sanctions in case of failure to comply (EurActiv 
2009b; Financial Times 2009; EurActiv 2010; Tait 2010).  By contrast, member states’ 
preferences about this issue diverged, with some member states such as the UK being 
watchful about preserving national regulatory autonomy (see also Buckley and Howarth 2010; 
Grossman and Leblond 2011; Spendzharova 2012). 
Public stakeholder consultation position papers from the mid-2000s provide further 
evidence of these disagreements (see for example European Banking Federation 2009; 
Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority 2009; Luxembourg Bankers’ Association 2009).  In 
January 2007, the Inter-institutional Monitoring Group invited all interested parties to 
comment on its second interim report on the Lamfalussy process.  It received 34 reactions 
from the main stakeholders, such as national and EU level industry associations, member 
states’ central banks, financial regulation agencies and finance ministries, banks and financial 
companies.  The consultation revealed that a number of stakeholders saw a problem in the 
existing incentives for the members of level 3 committees to follow predominantly national 
interests.  To correct this perceived shortcoming, they proposed that level 3 committees 
should be able to take binding decisions based on a majority vote.  This, in turn, would 
encourage supervisors to take a pan-European view rather than a national one (IIMG 2007, p.  
26). 
A major tipping point toward giving the European supervisory authorities greater 
regulatory powers occurred in 2009, following the 2008 global financial crisis.  In the June 
2009 ECOFIN Council meeting, member states agreed to give the ESAs powers to take binding 
decisions in order to promote harmonised and consistent supervision of financial institutions 
across the EU (Council 2009a: 4-6).  However, the UK led a coalition of member states 
demanding the adoption of the so-called ‘triple-lock’ safeguard mechanism, which provided 
the member states with multiple appeal mechanisms to contest decisions taken by the ESAs 
(EurActiv 2009a; EurActiv 2009c). The three steps of the ‘triple-lock’ mechanism are 
summarised as follows: as a first option, a member state can appeal a decision before the 
ECOFIN Council of Ministers.  A simple majority of at least 14 member states can then overturn 
that decision.  The second level is an appeal before the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
Third, as a last resort, a country can also appeal a decision before the European Council 
(EurActiv 2009a; EurActiv 2009c).  The October 2009 ECOFIN Council conclusions built up on 
the June 2009 decision and provided a detailed roadmap for the EU regulatory framework 
(Council 2009b). 
The European Commission launched its proposal for a directive specifying the powers of 
the three European supervisory authorities (2009/0161 COD) in October 2009, which was then 
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discussed by the Council in July 2010 and passed first reading in the European Parliament in 
September 2010.  The Parliament’s amendments further bolstered the European mandate of 
the ESAs, especially when it comes to overseeing cross-border financial institutions and 
imposing legally-binding mediation on national supervisory bodies or colleges of supervisors.  
Furthermore, MEPs gave the ESAs a stronger consumer protection profile: the ESAs gained 
powers to investigate specific financial institutions if they posed a significant risk to the 
European financial market.  The Parliament also achieved its priority to have veto power over 
the appointment of the ESA chairpersons (EurActiv 2010; European Parliament 2010).  Overall, 
the amendments introduced by the European Parliament increased further the powers of the 
European supervisory authorities and their supranational profile.  Within a month, the Council 
approved the Parliament’s amendments.  That, in turn, paved the way for the official adoption 
of the three European Union Regulations (1093/2010, 1094/2010, 1095/2010) that set up the 
European supervisory authorities and European Union Directive 2010/78/EU that specified 
their powers in November 2010. 
Since then, the Commission has carried out two formal rounds of policy evaluation of 
the ESAs, in 2014 and 2017, confirming that they are fulfilling their mandate as expected, but 
also emphasising the need for greater financial resources than originally anticipated 
(European Commission 2014, 2017). The latter point was very pressing in the case of ESMA in 
the 2017 Commission evaluation, which indicates that the EU institutions had not anticipated 
the extent of new tasks and demands that would be placed on ESMA after its creation in 2011. 
6. Challenges by the EU member states: CJEU case C-270/12 about EU short selling 
rules 
As we have seen so far, since its creation in 2011, ESMA has gained extensive powers to 
regulate European financial markets. At the same time, some EU member states, which from 
the very outset had reservations about preserving sovereignty is key areas of decision-making, 
have kept a close watch on the growing powers of EU agencies, as this has important 
implications for national regulatory autonomy. This concern was clearly manifested in June 
2013 when the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) heard a legal challenge to the EU Regulation 
on Short Selling in the case ‘C-270/12, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
v. Council of the European Union, European Parliament’. The UK’s government filed the legal 
challenge in 2012, aiming to curtail the powers of ESMA to stop or limit short selling across 
the 28 EU member states in the event of a crisis. Considering general developments in EU 
governance, the legal challenge before the CJEU was not unprecedented. The Court had 
already been involved in adjudicating cases dealing with scientific uncertainty and complexity 
(see Vos 2013). Nevertheless, the short-selling case was a crucial test whether ESMA’s 
expanded powers would withstand judicial scrutiny. 
The case brought up by the UK government refers to Article 28 of the EU Regulation on 
Short Selling (SSR) which provides ESMA with powers to intervene directly in financial markets 
in exceptional circumstances, for example, when the ‘orderly functioning and integrity of 
financial markets or the stability of the whole or part of the financial system in the Union are 
threatened’ (Art. 9(5) SSR). The article enables ESMA to prohibit or place conditions on 
‘entering into a short sale’ or ‘entering into other transaction in a financial instrument that 
confers a financial advantage in case of a decrease in value of another financial instrument’ 
(but this does not apply to sovereign debt and sovereign CDS). It is important to note that this 
type of intervention is not aimed at harmonisation of the single market in financial services, 
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but at safeguarding financial stability. According to Commission official Bernardus Smulders, 
‘the objective of those interventions is clearly one to ensure financial stability’. Furthermore, 
Anders Neergaard, a European Parliament official clarified that ESMA must ‘be able to show 
that there is a threat’ to financial markets before taking any decisions, which further ensures 
that the agency would not act in an arbitrary manner (Smulders and Neergaard cited in Bodoni 
and Brunsden 2013). 
The UK government questioned whether ESMA had the legal power to impose short 
selling bans if the member states’ national regulators did not see the need for such a ban. The 
legal case tested the boundaries of the so-called ‘Meroni Doctrine’, which governs the 
allocation of powers between the supranational EU level and the national level of the member 
states in the absence of specific treaty provisions. Going back to 1958 Meroni case (Meroni & 
Co., Industrie Metallurgiche, SpA v High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community), 
at that time, the Court stressed that the discretionary delegation of powers to EU agencies or 
similar independent bodies should not infringe the ‘principle of institutional balance’ between 
the Community and the member states. 
Pelkmans and Simoncini (2014, p. 2) have clarified the essentials of the Meroni doctrine, 
as applied to the short selling case. The EU Member States have delegated powers to the EU 
level, and it cannot be assumed that ‘any such powers can, in turn, be delegated to (say) an 
EU agency without an explicit decision, although an explicit Treaty base is not indispensable.’ 
If powers are delegated, they cannot be so wide that the ‘margin of discretion may lead to the 
execution of actual economic policy’ (Pelkmans and Simoncini 2014, p. 2). Under EU law, the 
body to which powers have been delegated should not make discretionary choices about the 
execution of policy, as this alters the ‘institutional balance’ in the Union. According to the UK 
government, ESMA’s powers to ban short selling constitute such a ‘wide discretion’, thus 
contradicting the Meroni doctrine. In addition, the UK government argued that the new 
powers of ESMA contradicted a principle set in the Romano case (C-98/80) concerning the 
prohibition on administrative bodies to adopt measures of general application with the force 
of law (see also Chamon 2011; Pelkmans and Simoncini 2014). 
The CJEU, however, ruled against the UK government. The Court’s assessment stated that 
in the broader context of financial stability, the additional powers for ESMA were warranted, 
especially because those powers were limited in significant ways in the relevant regulation. 
Advocate General Niilo Jääskinen also stressed that principles such as Meroni and Romano 
should be interpreted in light of the new EU constitutional framework after the Lisbon Treaty. 
Jääskinen (2013) emphasised that the Lisbon Treaty has introduced important safeguards that 
allow the EU co-legislators to lawfully delegate regulatory powers to EU agencies, such as Arts 
263 and 277 TFEU on judicial review. Therefore, the Advocate General emphasised that if 
delegation complied with the legal guarantees set by the current context of the treaties, no 
dangerous (and unlawful) shift of responsibility would occur (Jääskinen 2013). In line with this 
interpretation, the CJEU concluded that EU agencies: 
Have a high degree of professional expertise and work closely together in the 
pursuit of the objective of financial stability within the Union. … Therefore, Article 
28 of Regulation No.236/2012 … cannot be regarded as undermining the rules 





Since 2011, the three financial sector ESAs, and particularly ESMA, have become established 
regulators in EU financial sector governance. This chapter put forward an incrementalist 
institutional explanation of the observed trend toward greater supranationalisation to 
complement explanations focusing on rational institutional design after crises. Nevertheless, 
some EU member states, which from the very outset preferred to preserve national regulatory 
autonomy, have kept a close watch on the expanded powers of ESMA, in particular, and EU 
agencies and agency-like bodies in general. One important example illustrating this dynamic 
is the CJEU case brought up by the UK government in June 2013, which challenged the powers 
of ESMA to impose a ban on short selling. These powers could be used by ESMA to overrule a 
member state’s national securities regulator. The CJEU’s decision in the short selling case 
shows that, so far, the concerns about financial stability at the EU level have been paramount 
and, thus, the post-crisis trend to centralise and consolidate the powers of the ESAs in 
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